1968]

THE LITIGANT AND THE ABSENTEE IN
FEDERAL MULTIPARTY PRACTICE
Procedural devices permitting multiparty litigation are designed
to achieve the prompt adjudication of an entire dispute and to eliminate unnecessary and repetitive litigation. If this goal of judicial
efficiency were the only concern of these techniques, the development
of a workable set of federal multiparty procedures would be an easy
task. The number of acceptable devices is limited, however, by the
presence of another important consideration-the protection of the
interests of all persons who may be affected by the outcome of the
litigation. At the very least, this consideration requires that the rules
of procedure insure the adequate representation of such interested
persons by the actual litigants. This requirement may be derived from
the basic concept of due process-that the efficient administration of
justice should not be attained at the expense of the right of an interested but absent party.1 For these reasons, federal multiparty procedural devices must be designed and applied to insure protection of
all parties concerned with the dispute, as well as to achieve the goal
of judicial efficiency and economy.
In determining whether the interests of all parties affected by the
lawsuit are adequately protected, the concerned persons may be divided
into two groups: litigants and absentees. The difficulty in fashioning
an appropriate set of federal multiparty procedures stems from the
conflict between the interests of these two groups. The plaintifflitigant seeks complete relief as quickly as possible. If a person who
is in some way interested in the litigation is absent, the plaintifflitigant still expects the court to fashion appropriate relief, without
the absentee if necessary. The plaintiff-litigant also expects the court
to prevent the absentee from intervening, if that will delay the proceedings by raising tangential issues. The absentee, on the other
hand, expects to be permitted to join in a suit if his interests will be
affected in either a legal or a practical sense.' He also expects that
1 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
The Restatement of judgments describes the requirement of due process in these terms:
Due process of law means only that the interests of a person should be adequately represented; where it is not reasonably possible that he should be
heard in person or by one selected by him or acting on his sole account, the
requirement of reasonableness, which is at the basis of the rule of due process
of law, is satisfied if his interests are in fact adequately represented.
RESTATEMENT OF JtUDGMENTS

§ 86, comment b (1942).

2 Absentee's rights are affected "in a legal sense" when the absentee shares with

one of the litigants a right, the extent or existence of which is the subject of the
litigation. If the absentee does not share a right with one of the litigants, but does
possess a right of his own which may be endangered by the litigation, his right will
be affected "in a practical sense" by the litigation, e.g., where a joint tenant is sued
by a creditor, all joint tenants may be affected by a forced disposition of the property.
(531)
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if he chooses not to intervene, the court will nevertheless insure that
his interests are adequately represented.
Any workable system of federal multiparty techniques must
attempt to strike a balance between these competing interests. That
a rigid set of rules will not yield a fair balance in every case is selfevident. Therefore, the primary task of the rules is to serve as guidelines for the trial judge to use in fashioning an equitable result in a
particular case. In the federal system, the set of rules which performs
this function is rules 19, 24 and 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
By requiring the compulsory joinder of indispensable absentees,
old rule 19 assured that the absentee's rights would not be impaired
without his presence.4 Rule 24 permitted the absentee to intervene in
litigation where he believed that his rights were at stake.' Rule 23
provided for class actions, a device which permits many litigants to
resolve their individual claims at one time.' The rule necessarily involved a variety of litigant-absentee situations.7 In most class actions,
the absentee is spared the necessity of intervening since a litigant
represents his interests. Disagreements, however, can arise between
3 The defendant-litigant will have essentially the same attitude toward the absentee as the plaintiff-litigant. In compulsory joinder cases, the defendant-litigant
either might want the absentee joined in order to share the costs of settlement or
he might want the absentee excluded if exclusion will result in dismissal of the suit.
The second desire is not worthy of protection, however, since we are positing that
the plaintiff-litigant has a legitimate cause of action. The defendant-litigant's one
legitimate expectation-to have the absentee joined in order to share costs--coincides
with the plaintiff-litigant's desire.
In intervention cases, the defendant-litigant, like the plaintiff-litigant, will want
the absentee excluded from the proceedings. The defendant-litigant's feelings will be
stronger, however, since the absentee is an actual claimant against the defendantlitigant. Nevertheless, there will be times when the absentee must be admitted despite
the objections of the plaintiff- and defendant-litigants, in order to protect the absentee's
legitimate interests.
The role of the defendant-litigant in class actions will be discussed in greater
detail below. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
4 Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of this rule,
persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined on the same
side as plaintiffs or defendants.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a), 28 U.S.C. Rule 19 (1964) (emphasis added).
5 Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a
judgment in the action ....
FED. R. CIrv. P. 24(a), 28 U.S.C. Rule 24 (1964).
6Defendant classes are rare and are therefore discussed only in the footnotes.
See note 47 infra.
7 This Comment deals exclusively with the old spurious class action. Neither
the old true or hybrid class actions were as common as the spurious. Kalven &
Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHaI. L. Rv. 684, 698-99
(1941), and neither of them presented litigant-absentee problems as serious as those
posed by the spurious action, since the absentee was more closely connected with
the class.
A class action was "spurious" within the meaning of the old rule "when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is . . . (3)
several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 28 U.S.C. Rule 23 (1964).
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the litigant and the absentee over such issues as whether a litigant does
adequately represent the absentee, whether the absentee should be bound
by the result of the class action and whether due process has been
accorded the absentee.
An ideal set of procedural rules would protect the interests of
both the litigant and the absentee and at the same time be administrable
and time-saving. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19, 24 and 23,
as originally written, did not achieve these goals, and have been almost
entirely rewritten.' The old rules failed to protect adequately the
After discussing the weakinterests of the litigant or the absentee
nesses of the old rules, this Comment will explore the ways in which
the new rules attempt to cure these shortcomings and will suggest solutions to those problems in the rules which require still further reform.
JOINDER

Joinder involves all cases in which a plaintiff-litigant seeks to
bring an absentee into the suit. A litigant suing only a single defendant always can obtain complete relief by suing wherever jurisdiction can be obtained over him. The problem becomes more difficult
when there are two or more persons who are indispensable to a resolution of the plaintiff's claim.Y If these persons do not reside in the
same state, the litigant may be unable to find any forum which has
jurisdiction over all the parties who are necessary for the resolution
of his claim or a forum in which venue is proper. In such a case, the
litigant may be unable to obtain any relief at all or, at best, may secure
total relief only after suing each defendant in a forum in which the
defendant is subject to service of process.
The problem presented by joinder is, therefore, two-fold. First,
how do the courts determine whether an absentee is indispensable to
the litigation? Second, under what circumstances can a court obtain
jurisdiction over an indispensable absentee or, in the alternative, fashion
some relief without him? Since the definitional problem should be
8 Rules 19 and 23 and subsections (2) and (3) of rule 24(a) have been entirely
rewritten. Only § (b) of rule 24 remains entirely unchanged. See notes 14, 22, 37,

38, 41, 56, 57 infra.
9 Old Rule 19 failed to protect the plaintiff-litigant: he could not always join an
indispensable absentee in the litigation. See text accompanying notes 10-11 infra. Old
rule 24 failed to protect the absentee: he could not always intervene as a matter of
right, if his interests were only affected in a practical sense. See text accompanying
notes 38-39 infra. The old spurious class action rule, 23(a) (3), failed to protect both
the plaintiff- and defendant-litigants: the absentee was not bound by the result of
the class action. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
10 Two or more persons might be indispensable if 1) they are all defendants and
are jointly liable to the plaintiff, e.g., all the endorsers of a note, Shields v. Barrow,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854), or 2) at least one of them is not a defendant but is
so related to the controversy that he must be present for a complete resolution of
the plaintiff's claim, e.g., the owner of a patent where the suit is against a licensee
for patent infringement. Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,
269 U.S. 459 (1926).
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viewed differently depending upon whether the court has the power
to bind an absentee outside its jurisdiction, this Comment will treat
the jurisdictional problem first.
Shields v. Barrow " is a classic example of the jurisdictional difficulty created by the concept of indispensable parties. In a suit to
rescind a note due to him, Barrow sued Shields, the signer, and six
endorsers. The Supreme Court concluded that all seven were indispensable. Unfortunately for Barrow, all seven parties did not live in
the same state and the Court dismissed the action. Thus, unless
Barrow could find all seven in the same jurisdiction-a highly unlikely contingency under the circumstances-he could not sue for
rescission.
Although some courts managed to sidestep this harsh result by
straining to avoid the conclusion that the absentee was, in fact, indispensable," others refused to restrict the definition of indispensability."
With the courts following divergent views, there was little certainty
as to when a person was indispensable to litigation.
The new rule has not attacked this jurisdictional problem head-on,
but merely has tried to diminish the extent of the problem by relaxing
the definition of indispensable parties.' 4 This change will not solve the
problem since, regardless of which definition the courts decide to use,
there still will be instances where an absentee is indispensable and must
be joined in the litigation.
These jurisdictional requirements, which can defeat a litigant's
cause of action, are in no way related to the merits of his claim against
the absentee. It therefore seems logical to inquire whether there might
be other means of safeguarding the absentee's rights, which the jurisdiction rules seek to protect, without foreclosing the litigant's cause
of action. The primary purpose behind the territorial limitation on
"158 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854). For a criticism of Shields v. Barrow, see
Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Partiesin Civil Actions, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 327, 340-56
(1957).
12
See, e.g., Bourdieu v. Pacific W. Oil Co., 299 U.S. 65, 71 (1936); Stevens v.
Loomis, 334 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1964) ; Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179
F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1950); S. C. Johnson & Son v. Boe, 187 F. Supp. 517, 520 (E.D.
Pa. 1960); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg, 8 F.R.D. 151, 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); Hazard, Indispensable Party-The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLIum. L. REv. 1254, 1287-89 (1961) ; Reed, mpra note 11, at
336-37.

13 See, e.g., Fouke v. Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1952); Calcote v.
Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Sneed v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 76 F2d 785 (5th Cir. 1935).
14 A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating
to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action
in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
FED. R. Crv. P. 19(a).
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the jurisdiction of federal district courts is to protect the defendant
from the inconvenience, cost and possible prejudice of defending the
suit in a forum distant from his residence or place of business, 5 an
unquestionably legitimate aim. Nonetheless, since the ultimate goal
of our legal system is the complete and fair adjudication of all private
claims, a method which creates less of an obstacle to the thorough
administration of justice than do rigid jurisdiction requirements is
necessary to protect defendants from remote litigation. When joinder
of several absentees is necessary to provide a forum which is capable
of rendering complete relief, jurisdictional requirements should be
relaxed in order to give the court power over absentees throughout the
United States. A statute implementing such an expansion of jurisdiction has been proposed by the American Law Institute. If an
absentee is indispensable and without the jurisdiction of the court, the
ALl-proposed statute, instead of calling for dismissal of the suit, gives
the court jurisdiction over the absentee:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action in which the several defendants who are necessary
for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim are not all
amenable to process of any one territorial jurisdiction, and
one of any two adverse parties is a citizen of a State and the
other is a citizen .

.

. of another territorial jurisdiction. 6

Under the proposal, the trial court may issue service of process "anywhere within the territorial limits of the United States and anywhere
outside those territorial limits that process of the United States may
reach . .

.

,""

By giving federal courts the power of nationwide service of process
over "indispensable parties," the plaintiff is assured that his claim
will not be dismissed because of his inability to join all parties necessary
for the resolution of his claim. At the same time, such extraordinary
power should be invoked only when the absentee is truly necessary.
15 See 2 J. MOORE, FEDmAL PRACriCE 111 4.02[31-[5] (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. Another purpose of territorial limitations on the jurisdiction of
federal district courts seems to be an effort rationally to allocate business among the
several district courts. A deviation from standard jurisdictional requirements in the
case of multiparty litigation, for good reasons, would not seem to vitiate this objective.
A final purpose of the jurisdictional limits is an attempt to make the jurisdictional
limits of the federal courts coextensive with the limits of the respective state courts.
There are situations, however, where it is necessary for the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to extend beyond that of the state courts. The Federal Interpleader Act is
an example of such a situation. See note 69 infra. A second example is the 100-mile
rule. See Fed. I. Civ. P. 4(f). It is the position of this Comment that the type
of multistate, multiparty litigation discussed herein is another situation calling for
more expansive federal jurisdiction.
16

ALl

STUDY OF THE DIVisioN OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS §2341(a)

(Official Draft Part 1, Sept. 1965)

See 3A MOORE 19.01-1 [7].
17 Id. § 2344(a).

[hereinafter cited as ALl].
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Therefore, the determination of when an individual is "indispensable" should be made carefully, so that parties only tangentially
related to the litigation will not be required to attend. On the other
hand, if this proposal is not adopted and dismissal may result because
of limited jurisdiction, the determination of indispensability is all the
more important.
Under old rule 19,18 if an absentee shared a "joint interest" with
the litigant, he was deemed indispensable to the proceedings; " if he
was indispensable and the court could not obtain jurisdiction over him,
dismissal was required.2" This rule often proved to be a stumbling
block to the litigant, for the dismissal of the suit could well mean the
end of a valid cause of action.
The new rule tries to deal with this problem by substituting a
more pliable standard for the inflexible "joint interest" test.2" The
trial judge is to decide on the basis of the facts before him whether a
particular absentee's interests are so related to the litigation that the
suit cannot be adjudicated without affecting them. If the absentee is
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the trial judge determines that the
presence of the absentee is essential and the court cannot fashion any
relief without him, dismissal remains mandatory.'
It remains to be seen to what degree the new rule will differ from
the old. Commentators on the new rule have remarked that it: 1) goes
18 For the text of old rule 19, see note 4 supra.
19 In 1854, the Supreme Court set down the following often-quoted definition of
a joint interest:
an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either
affecting that interest, or leaving that controversy in such a condition that
its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience, ....
Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854). See, e.g., Hilton v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 327 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1964) (nonparticipating royalty holders are indispensable parties in a suit which could result in termination of the oil and gas lease
under which such holders received payment).
See, e.g., Shields v.
2O Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (7), 28 U.S.C. Rule 12 (1964).
Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854) ; Hilton v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 327 F.2d 217
(5th Cir. 1964) ; Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946) ;
United States v. Washington Institute of Technology, Inc., 138 F.2d 25 (3d Cir.
1943); United States v. Fried, 183 F. Supp. 371 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Campbell v.
Pacific Fruit Exp. Co., 148 F. Supp. 209 (D. Idaho 1957) ; Photometric Prods. Corp.
v. Radtke, 17 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
21 For the text of new rule 19(a), see note 14 supra.
If a person as described in subdivision (a) (1)- (2) hereof cannot be made
a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the
action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed,
the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be
considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered inthe person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties;
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided;
third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.
FE. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
22
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too far in that it could be interpreted as overruling existing case law; m
2) does no more than codify existing indispensable party decisions; 24
or 3) does not go far enough because the rule still revolves around the
concept of an "indispensable" party. 5
The abolition of the rigid "joint interest" test is a commendable
beginning. At the same time, because the Advisory Committee failed
to explain the role of the old case law in relation to the new rule, and
because the rule continues to use the term "indispensable," the new
rule may further confuse rather than clarify the area of necessary
joinder. If a series of cases beginning in the nineteenth century holds
that an absentee in a given situation is indispensable, does the new rule
ignore these cases and allow the trial judge to decide that such an
absentee is not indispensable?2 6
23Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rude 19,

74

L.J. 403, 430 (1965) :
The committee completely ignores the role of precedent in determining
joinder requirements. Is every joinder question under the proposed rule
to be decided ad hoc? What of the cases in which the Supreme Court or
other appellate courts have determined that in certain situations a given
absent party is or is not indispensable? ......
Does the proposed rule
attempt to overrule prior case law? If so, on what basis of authority?
Fink feels that the courts will interpret the new rule in line with the standard laid
down by the First Circuit in Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 777-78 (1st Cir. 1964):
[W]e think that true indispensable parties are only those whose interests
could not be excluded from the terms or consequences of the judgment and
leave anything, or appreciably anything, for the judgment effectively to
operate upon . . . . In other words, if there may be a viable judgment
having separable affirmative consequences with respect to parties before the
court, and the inquiry is concerned solely with the inequities, in the light of
the total circumstances, resulting from the inability to affect absent interested
parties, then such other parties should be defined as merely necessary, not
indispensable.
24 Supplemental Report of the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, 37 F.R.D. 71, 89 (1965) (statement of
Professor John R. McDonough):
[The proposed revision of rule 19] purports to rewrite Rule 19 to say
on its face what the courts have said that it really means. If this is what the
proposed Rule does, I think we should be for it. If the proposed Rule does
not restate the substance of existing law we might be against it on that
ground ....
25
Cohn, The New Federal Rdes of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1211
(1966) :
It is too easy for courts to use the word "indispensable" as a link to the
old rule and its old formalistic concepts. Upon this ground, the bulk of conflicting precedents may be deemed applicable to the new rule, and the special
classifications of old rule 19 may survive. Such an approach would certainly
be inconsistent with the purpose of the change in the rule.
When the proposed revisions in the rules of civil procedure were first announced
in 1964, rule 19 adopted the concept of "contingently necessary" parties. 34 F.R.D.
371, 379 (1964). The reaction to the new term was very unfavorable, and the term
was excluded altogether from the final proposed revisions. 39 F.R.D. 73, 88 (1965).
26The indispensable party doctrine is not procedural. It declares substantive
law and accords a substantive right to a person to be joined as a party to an
action when his interests or rights may be affected by its outcome. The
indispensable party doctrine is beyond the reach of, and not affected by,
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, since the Rules, as later
developed, cannot "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right".
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F2d 802,
805 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 940 (1967). But see 3A MooRE.f 19.01-1[4].
See Fink, supra note 23, at 430.
YAi
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Judging from the reaction of some members of the legal profession
that there was no need to revise old rule 19,27 it seems probable that
the profession may continue to rely on the old case law in interpreting
the new rule. Although, under the new rule, the trial judge is directed
to determine who is an indispensable party according to the facts of
each case, with such a welter of divergent views on what constitutes
an indispensable party, it is quite likely that the judge will continue to
look to the old case law for guidance. If this is so, then the new rule
has not made as significant a change as the draftsmen intended.
The text of the new rule is excellent, in that it calls for individual
treatment of each case. Trial judges thus should ignore the old case
law and consider, in each suit, what effect the absence of the absentee
will have on the plaintiff's claim. If the plaintiff cannot obtain complete relief without the absentee's presence, the trial judge should
require that the absentee be joined, even if this requires dismissal.
Under the jurisdictional proposal here outlined, the judge should use
the same criterion and issue service of process regardless of where the
absentee lives. The approach of the new rules properly brings before
the court those absentees necessary to the litigation, regardless of the
court's jurisdictional power. The combination of the more flexible
definition of indispensable parties I plus the expanded jurisdictional
power of the court which has been proposed herein places the absentee
in much greater danger of being called upon to participate in litigation
far from home. To protect the absentee from this danger this Comment suggests new cost-taxing provisions which will be discussed in
depth below. 9
A litigant-plaintiff seeking to join two or more defendants residing in different states must contend with venue, as well as jurisdiction, requirements. The present venue statute for diversity cases
allows the plaintiff to bring his suit in any district where all the
plaintiffs or all the defendants reside or in the district in which the
27 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the
iudicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, 36 F.R.D. 209 (1964); Supplemental Report
of the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the Ninth Circuit, 37 F.R.D. 71 (1965) ; Fink, supra note 23, at 433.
2
8 The ALI model statute defines an indispensable party in these terms:
A defendant is necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim, within
the meaning of this chapter, if complete relief cannot be accorded the plaintiff
in his absence, or if it appears that, under federal law or relevant State law,
an action on the claim would have to be dismissed if he could not be joined

as a party.

ALl § 2341(b).
The Commentary to this section explains that the first clause encompasses "any
circumstances in which a person would be deemed 'indispensable' by any court."
ALT 136. The second clause is aimed at aberrational state determinations of indispensability which fall outside the bounds of the first clause. Id. Under the ALI
statute, joint and several or several tort-feasors are not necessary parties in an action
against the other tort-feasor.
29
See text accompanying notes 35-36 infra.
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claim arose.8 0 In the situations treated by this Comment-multistate,
multiparty suits-the only district which is likely to qualify under the
residency requirements is the district where all the plaintiffs reside.
If the jurisdiction statute proposed above is adopted, however, there
is the danger that the plaintiff may be able to obtain jurisdiction over
the defendant in the plaintiff's home state and subject him to the less
favorable laws of that state."' Under present law, the defendant is
protected for the most part from this danger by the jurisdiction rules;
under the proposal set forth in this Comment, the defendant must be
protected by abolishing, in this situation, the residency test for
proper venue.
The second venue test under the present statute-venue is properly
laid in the district where the claim arose-fails to give the trial judge
sufficient guidance to decide whether a case is properly before him.
First, "where the claim arose" is a vague criterion open to several
different interpretations and is particularly unhelpful in the multiparty,
multistate situation; second, the statute seems to limit venue to one
state, whereas there may be more than one state which has sufficient
interest in the case to be proper for venue; third, where the claim
arose is only one of several contacts with the controversy which
should be considered in selecting the proper venue. A more precise
venue statute, therefore, should be adopted, similar to that proposed
by the ALl:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded solely on
section 2341 of this title may be brought only in a district
where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred or where a substantial part of
property which is the subject of the action is situated, except
that where there is no such district within the United States,
the action may be brought in any district where any party
resides. 82
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial
district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a) (Supp. 1967).
81 It is true that the plaintiff can now obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in
the plaintiff's state if the defendant voluntarily enters that state and is served while
in the state. Plaintiff obtains jurisdiction over the defendant in this case because of
80

a free choice made by the defendant. Under the jurisdiction statute advocated in
this Comment, the defendant does not have such a choice. The need therefore arises
to protect the defendant from being subjected to the laws of the plaintiff's state, where

the defendant has not chosen to enter it
32 ALl §2342(a). The note to this section states:
Commencement venue of original actions under § 2341 is limited by this section to those federal districts having substantial contacts with the subject of

the action. Except where there is no such district (because all relevant events

and property are outside the United States), venue is not authorized in terms
of the parties' residence.
See 3A Moo!E ff 19.01-1[7]
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This proposed venue statute would not only provide a forum which
would be a fair compromise for all the defendants, but would also
facilitate the adjudication of the suit, since, presumably, most of the
necessary witnesses would live near the forum.
The proposed venue statute would also remove most of the
problems involved in selecting the proper conflict-of-laws rules to apply
in a multiparty, multistate suit. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co.,8" the Supreme Court held that a federal district court, sitting
in a diversity case, must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the state
in which it is sitting. The contingency that most endangers the
absentee under the proposed jurisdiction statute is that the plaintiff
will sue the defendant in the plaintiff's state and the district court will
apply that state's conflict-of-laws rule because of Klaxon. The proposed venue statute, however, requires that the action be brought in
a state having sufficient contacts with the controversy. Therefore, the
absentee is safe in the knowledge that only the conflict-of-laws rules
of a state having sufficient contacts with the case will be employed in
selecting the proper substantive law. 4
One final danger for the absentee is posed by the proposed jurisdiction rules. If the absentee is forced to defend the suit in a state
other than his own, his expenses undoubtedly will be greater than
if he were defending the suit at home. Under present law, the defendant can only be sued in his home state, unless the plaintiff somehow
obtains jurisdiction over him in another state. Therefore, if the proposed jurisdiction statute is accepted, a further provision should be
adopted to insure that the absentee's costs in defending the suit in a
foreign jurisdiction will be no greater than his costs were he to defend
the suit at home. Such a proposed rule might require that all the
absentee's expenses in excess of what it would cost him to defend the
suit in his own state be taxed to the plaintiff.8 5 Such costs could
33

313 U.S. 487 (1941).

34 The ALI proposal advocates the suspension of the Klaxon rule in multiparty,

multistate cases:
Whenever State law supplies the rule of decision on an issue, the district

court may make its own determination as to which State rule of decision is

applicable.
ALT § 2344 (c). See the Commentary to § 2344(c), ALI 149-52.
Suspending the Klaxon rule for multiparty, multistate cases may engender more

controversy and confusion than it resolves. As indicated above, the venue rule limits

the applicable conflict-of-laws rules to those states having sufficient contacts with
the controversy. Therefore, in most cases, there would be no need to suspend Klaxon.

If in unusual cases the district court feels that it should not apply the conflict-of-laws
rule of the state in which it is sitting, it would be easier for the district court merely

to transfer the case to a more convenient forum than to suspend the Klaxon rule for
all multiparty, multistate cases.
35Taxing costs is a common feature of most trials today, although, admittedly,
most of the costs taxed are trial expenses and not traveling expenses of the opposing
party. It-is the practice in the federal courts, however, to include in the costs taxed
to one party the traveling expenses of the other party in coming to have his deposition
taken if the location chosen for the deposition is unnecessarily inconvenient. See,
e.g., Perry v. Edwards, 16 F.R.D. 131 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Alexander v. Oberndorf,
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include traveling expenses for both the absentee and his attorney,
reasonable allowance for food and lodging and expenses incurred in
bringing witnesses and experts from the defendant's home to the
forum. At the same time, however, the plaintiff should receive a
credit for all expenses saved by the defendant for witnesses and experts
already residing in the forum state. Such a cost-taxing rule not only
would protect the defendant from the expense of defending the suit in
a distant forum, but also would discourage the plaintiff from bringing
frivolous suits. 6
INTERVENTION

Intervention differs from joinder in that the absentee wants to be
included, and the litigant either opposes the absentee's presence or at
least believes the absentee's presence to be unimportant to his claim.
The absentee, on the other hand, desires to be included, precisely
because he feels that the resolution of the litigant's claim will affect his
rights. If the judgment in the suit can extinguish or impair some right
of the absentee, to deny intervention is tantamount to denying him a
day in court.
Old rule 24 provided two categories of intervention: compulsory
and permissive. If an absentee faced the threat of being legally bound
by the result of litigation and his interests were not adequately represented, he could intervene in the litigation as a matter of right.3 7 If
the absentee could not qualify under this definition, he had to seek
the court's permission to intervene.s The major weakness in this
13 F.R.D. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

The cost taxation policies proposed in this Com-

ment could best be implemented in a congressional enactment.
The ALT proposed statute allows the trial judge to dismiss suits involving claims
of less than $5000 if absentees will be unduly burdened by traveling great distances.
ALI § 2344(e).
36
These costs will be taxed to the plaintiff-litigant, regardless of whether he
wins or loses the suit. This result is necessitated by the fact that the proposed jurisdiction statute gives the plaintiff-litigant extraordinary powers over the absentee which
he does not possess under present law. As a price for using these powers, he must
bear the absentee's expenses. If the plaintiff-litigant does not want to incur these
expenses, he must be satisfied in suing the absentee in his own state or wherever he
can obtain jurisdiction over him.
37Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest
by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be
bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court
or an officer thereof.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), 28 U.S.C. Rule 24 (1964). See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962); International Mortgage & Inv.
Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen
Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
This Comment will only consider subsection (2), since subsections (1) and (3) are
seldom invoked.
38Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right
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arrangement was similar to that which plagued old rule 19: a rigid
rule, which was based on the legal rights of the absentee, failed to
take into account the effect a given judgment might have on his rights
in a practical sense. 9
The new rule attempts to cure many of the defects in the old
rule by expanding intervention as a matter of right to include those
cases in which the absentee's rights will be impaired in a practical
sense, but not necessarily in a legal sense; such an absentee will be
permitted to intervene without regard to the inconvenience caused the
other parties." If an absentee has an interest in a suit, but not to
the extent required by rule 24(a), he can still fall back on rule 24(b), '
which permits intervention at the court's discretion. When an absentee petitions to intervene under subsection 24(b), the court considers the convenience of the litigants above the interest of the absentee,
since the absentee's rights will not be impaired by the litigation. If the
trial court finds that the absentee's intervention will not unduly prejudice the litigants or delay the trial, intervention will be allowed in the
interest of resolving as many claims in one suit as possible. In order
to remain flexible enough to deal with varied multiparty situations, the
rule wisely retained both intervention by right and permissive
intervention.
With the liberalized standards for intervention by right, the
absentee's interests are better protected under the new rule. It is
important, however, that the rule not be interpreted in a way which
overlooks the interests of the litigants. When the plaintiff brought the
suit, he expected the court to resolve the controversy as quickly as
possible at minimum cost; the defendant was not prepared to defend
against the claims of an unexpected party. In light of these legitimate
expectations, it is unjust to allow the absentee an automatic right to
intervene if intervention would result in the consideration of issues

tangential to the plaintiff's cause of action. In short, the absentee
should be permitted to intervene without consideration of the hardship
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
Fm. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
3
9 See note 2 .ipra. An example of this distinction in the area of intervention
is where the primary beneficiary of a will is sued by a claimant of his share-a residual
legatee should be allowed to intervene even though his legal rights are not at stake.
40 (a) Intervention of Right Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
FD.41R. Crv. P. 24(a).
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b), note 38 supra, remains unchanged in the new rules. The
vast majority of interventions which arise under § (b) fall under subsection (2).
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thrust upon the litigants, only when he is able to demonstrate to the
court that the adjudication of the plaintiff's claim will affect his rights
either legally or practically. In all other cases, the trial judge should
permit intervention only if the increase in the efficient administration
of justice will be great and the inconvenience and prejudice to the litigants comparatively minor.
There are two other requirements in the new rule which the trial
judge must consider in deciding whether to grant a motion to intervene,
even when the rights of the absentee definitely will be affected by the
litigation. First, the new rule retains the requirement set forth in the
old rule that no absentee shall be permitted to intervene if his interests
are already adequately represented. Among the factors the trial judge
should consider in deciding this are whether the litigant is genuinely
contesting the suit and whether he is advancing the same claims as
the absentee. One of the more perplexing factors the trial judge might
have to consider is the quality of the litigant's attorney. Certainly, the
absentee is not "adequately represented" if the litigant has retained a
poor attorney. On the other hand, the trial judge will be quite reluctant to grant an absentee's motion to intervene for the announced
reason that the litigant's attorney is poor. Perhaps the only solution
to this dilemma is for the trial judge not to consider the quality of the
litigant's attorney unless the absentee raises the issue. If the absentee
does contend that he should be allowed to intervene because the litigant's attorney is poor, then the trial judge is obliged to consider
the issue.'
Instead of placing emphasis only on the issue of whether the
absentee is adequately represented, the rule also should approach the
question from a second front. If intervention by the absentee will not
disrupt the trial, he should be allowed to intervene regardless of how
well his interests are already being protected. The trial judge should
consider both the disruption which will ensue if the absentee is allowed
to intervene and the degree to which the absentee's rights are already
being protected, when deciding upon a motion to intervene.
A second requirement in new rule 24, also present in the old
rule, is that the judge must determine, in deciding upon a motion to
intervene, whether the motion is "timely." This determination depends on the facts of each case, particularly the reasons for the
absentee's late appearance, the degree to which the intervention will
disrupt the trial and the degree to which the absentee's interests will
be affected by the outcome of the litigation. If the absentee's rights
42
In any given situation the trial judge will have to consider several additional
factors depending on the facts of the particular case. The judge might consider
important elements of trial strategy, such as whether key witnesses have been called
by the litigant, or due process considerations, such as whether the absentee has been
made aware of important developments in the trial.
The new rule has not changed the substantive standards of adequacy of representation. Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131 (D. Minn. 1966).
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will be affected by the suit in such a way that he may be unable to
vindicate them in subsequest litigation, the court should allow intervention at any time before judgment, provided that the absentee's
failure to intervene earlier was not caused by his own neglect. If, on
the other hand, the absentee will be able to protect his rights in a later
suit, he generally should not be permitted to intervene, if his intervention will hinder or impair the adjudication of the litigants' rights.43
Such an absentee should also not be permitted to intervene, except in
unusual circumstances, after the pretrial order or after any other time
established in the district.44
If the trial judge decides to allow the intervention, he should grant
a continuance if either litigant requests one and can prove that he will
be prejudiced if a continuance is not granted. A continuance in such
a situation is necessary to maintain the balance between the absentee
who has received permission to intervene and the litigant who did not
originally expect that the absentee would be a party to the suit.45
CLASS ACTIONS

The two previous sections have dealt with the relationship between
the litigant and the absentee in nonrepresentative litigation, that is, in
suits where the litigants represented only their own interests.4 6 This
section of the Comment deals with the more complex situation presented when either the plaintiff-litigant or the defendant-litigant is the
representative of a class. For purposes of this section, the absentee is
also a member of that class, but not involved in the actual litigation.
The fact that the absentee and one of the litigants are now members
of the same class alters the relationship between them and creates new
interests and problems.
The interests of a particular litigant will vary, depending on
whether he is the party opposing the class or a representative of the
class. Assume, first, that the litigant is the party opposing the class.
43 See generally 4 MooiR f 24.13.
44 A general rule in each district as to when motions to intervene must be filed
would better guide attorneys and thereby expedite litigation.

45 Some courts have held that "intervention in an in personain action under a

discretionary right must be supported by independent grounds of jurisdiction, except
when the action is a class action." Beard-Laney, Inc. v. Pressley, 18 FR.D. 162,
163 (W.D.S.C. 1955). See, e.g., Hamilton v. Civillico, 34 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
Glover v. McFaddin, 99 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Tex. 1951); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Cook
24.18[1], at
Bros., Inc., 23 F.R.D. 269 (S.D. Ind. 1959) (dictum); 4 MooR
136-37. Certainly in the case of class actions and of intervention as of right, there
seem to be strong reasons for not requiring the intervening parties to satisfy independent grounds of jurisdiction. However, it seems that with regard to permissive
intervention, failure to insist on the same jurisdictional requirements which would
have been applicable had the intervenor participated in the suit originally would

permit
circumvention of the jurisdictional rules.
46
This is not to say that joinder and intervention cannot arise in the context of
a class action, but only that a consideration of these techniques does not include
analysis of representational interests, except to the extent that an absentee cannot

intervene if his interests are already adequately represented by a litigant
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The class action device benefits the litigant-defendant 7 opposing the
class, in that he is able to defend against all claims in only one suit.
Therefore, he wants all the members of the class, whether actually
before the court or not, to be bound by the result of the litigation, so
that the judgment in the case will be res judicata for any subsequent
claims. Of course, this statement of the interests of the litigant is
based on a situation where the class the litigant is opposing is closely
united and clearly defined and has but one cause of action against him.
If the class consists of a loosely organized collection of similar, but not
entirely identical, interests, the class action device is advantageous only
for the resolution of common issues, but not of total claims; it may
result in the resolution of all issues for various subclasses, but not for
the class as a whole. In each case the court must decide whether the
class action device is best suited for the particular suit or only for
part of it, bearing in mind such factors as the size and composition
of the class, its cohesiveness, the unity of its interests and the nature
of the litigant's defenses.
On the other side of the suit, the litigant representing the class,
although enjoying a different relationship with the absentee, will also
want him bound by the result of the litigation. The litigant-plaintiff
who is a member of the class will want the absentee to contribute to
the costs of bringing the suit 4 s The most effective means to encourage
this contribution is to make the absentee aware, from the outset, that
he will be bound by the result.49
As a general rule, then, both the plaintiff-litigant and the
defendant-litigant want the absentee class member bound by the result
of the class action. The old spurious class action,50 however, was a
classic example of an absentee's having his cake and eating it too.
Each member of the class had a similar but separate cause of action.5"
47 Because the vast majority of class actions involve plaintiff classes, the textual
discussion in this Comment will be limited to this factual hypothesis. One of the few
common defendant classes is the unincorporated association. See, e.g., Tunstall v.

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945).
If the litigant opposing the class is the plaintiff, he will want all members of the
class, regardless of whether they are actual parties, to be bound so that he will only
have to sue once to obtain complete relief on all his claims against the class.
48 In the uncommon situation where the litigant member of the class is a defendant, see note 47 supra, he will want the absentees to be bound so that they will have
to contribute to the judgment if the class loses.
49 If the class wins, the litigant may well recoup all his expenses if enough
absentees intervene after judgment and contribute to the litigation costs. If the
class loses, however, the litigant will have to bear all the expenses himself, since no
absentees will intervene after judgment. Binding the absentees from the outset
should protect the litigant from this precarious financial position-presumably more
absentees will intervene before judgment and contribute to the expenses in order to
ensure the best possible prosecution of the suit, since they will be bound by the judgment in any case.
50 For the text of old rule 23(a) (3), see note 7 supra. Again, this Comment
deals solely with the old spurious class action and the discussion does not pertain
to either the old true or hybrid class actions.
513 MooRE 23.10[1], at 3443; see FED. R. CIr. P. 23; Advisory Committee Note,
39 F.R.D. 69, 98-107 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Note].
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Therefore, an absentee who was not an active litigant in the suit could
not be bound by the result of the class action, since his cause of action
was not identical to the claims of class representatives.52 If the class
won, however, some courts allowed the absentees to take advantage of
the favorable judgment.5" Thus the absentee never lost. Even if he
were not permitted to share in a favorable judgment, he had taken no
risk and now possessed a definite settlement advantage over the
defendant-litigant. Both the opposing litigant and the class representative litigant were the losers.5"
It is apparent that the interests of the absentee are quite different
from those of either litigant-the absentee wants to be included in
the judgment if the class wins, but not to be bound by the result if
the class loses. If he is allowed to choose in this fashion, the balance
of interests is tipped in his favor, at the expense of both the class
representative litigant and the litigant opposing the class.55 Yet, this
was precisely the state of the law under the old spurious class action.
There are two other possible solutions. First, the class action
rule could dictate that the absentee not be affected by the judgment,
regardless of whether the class wins or loses. However, this solution
would undermine the purpose behind the class action; the device would
degenerate into nothing more than a suit between the single litigant
and the particular members of the class bringing the suit. If only
those members of a class who are actually before the court are to be
bound, then there is no point in using the device, for all members of
the class will eventually have to appear in court.
A more realistic solution is to bind the absentee to the result of
the litigation, regardless of the outcome. As has been seen, this solution would be most favorable to the litigants, but might well be less
attractive to the absentee. Our legal system does not usually compel
individuals to bring suits, and this, in effect, is what would happen
if the courts were to bind all absentees to the result of class actions
in which they did not actively participate. To meet this objection,
52

E.g., P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Newman, 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Kaeppler v. James H. Matthews & Co., 180 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1960); see 2 W.
BARRoN & A. HoLTzioFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 572 (rev. ed. 1961);

F. JAMEs, CnvL PROCEDURE § 10.18, at 497 (1965) ; 3 MooREf 23.11[3], at 3465-68.
5
3See
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir.

1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F2d 973
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952); System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees
Dep't v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1950) ; York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d
503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on, other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); P. W. Husserl,
Inc. v. Newman, 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100
F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ky. 1951). See generally Advisory Committee Note 98-107.
Z4 If the absentee is required to contribute to the class representative's costs in
bringing the suit as a condition for intervening after judgment, the hardship on the
class representative litigants is, of course, less severe. Nevertheless, if the absentee
knows he will be able to intervene after judgment if the class wins, there is no
incentive for him to join the suit before that time, and consequently the class representative litigants may have trouble arousing enough interest initially to bring the suit.
W For a divergent viewpoint, see Kalven & Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 691-95.
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the courts should allow an absentee to remove himself from the class
action if he can present adequate justification for such exclusion. If he
cannot, he should be bound by the result.
The draftsmen of new rule 23 have adopted a middle course between old rule 23 and the proposal made above. In a class action
brought under new rule 2 3 ," all absentees will be notified of the class
action and, if they do not request to be excluded from the suit, will be
bound by the result whether favorable or not."' This better protects
56 (a)

Prerequisites to a Class Action.

One or more members of a class

may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
FE. R. Civ. P. 23.
Cases decided under the new rule thus far have failed to develop any definite
rules as to when the courts will allow a class action to proceed. 3A MooRE 23.08(1)
(Supp. 1967). More definite rules may be developed soon; the Second Circuit has
held that a decision by a district court rejecting a class action is a final and appealable
order. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
57 [(c)] (2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests
by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through
his counsel.
Id. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the interests of the litigants, since all claims will now be resolved in
one litigation, unless the absentee affirmatively seeks exclusion. The
litigant is still not entirely protected, however, since the absentee will
automatically be dismissed from the judgment if he merely requests
exclusion. Once again the Advisory Committee's revisions have moved
in the right direction, but not far enough. As indicated above, a
better rule would require the absentee to present valid reasons to the
court why his claim should not be adjudicated along with the similar
claims of the other members of the class. The major reason the absentee might advance is that he is opposed in principle to litigating this
cause of action." The court might also excuse the absentee if he
can indicate to the court that the class action could better be handled
in subclasses. The court must decide in each case whether the absentee
should be excluded, weighing in the balance the nature of the absentee's
objection and the disruption which will ensue if this particular absentee
is excused. 9
There are some absentee objections which the trial judge should
be able to remedy with an appropriate procedural adjustment, short
of exclusion. For instance, if the judge finds that the absentee's objection centers on inadequate representation, he should allow more members of the class to intervene. If the absentee's complaint is the high
cost of travel to the location of the trial, the trial judge might tax the
class representative the difference in cost for the absentee between
contesting the suit in his own state and contesting it in the forum
state."0 If the class is extremely large and unwieldy, the trial judge
might consider dividing it into two or three smaller classes and transferring the subclasses to the appropriate forum.61 A major disadvantage to this solution is, of course, the threat of inconsistent
results in different forums. Finally, if there is a major disagreement
among members of the class which does not become apparent until
all members are notified of the class action, the judge may decide at
58 It is quite conceivable that a member of a class might not consider it equitable
or prudent to sue a particular litigant. If such is the case, that absentee should be
excused. At the same time, however, he should be estopped from later bringing his
own suit, simply because he changed his mind. If exclusion is granted for this reason,
the court should have the absentee's reason for seeking exclusion inserted in the record,
and the litigant opposing the class should be allowed to raise this request as an estoppel
in a subsequent suit by the absentee. The plaintiff would, of course, have the burden
of explaining his reasons for bringing the suit at that time.
If the absentee seeks exclusion, not because he is opposed to the suit, but because
he objects to the location of the trial, the timing, the pleadings or some other alleged
defect in the proceedings thus far, the trial judge is faced with a balancing task.
In deciding whether to allow the absentee's request for exclusion, the judge must
consider the merits of the absentee's contentions, as opposed to the disadvantage to the
litigants if the absentee is excused.
59 If the class is composed of defendants, the court should be very hesitant to
excuse an absentee who might be liable for a share of the judgment if the class loses.
00 If a defendant class is involved, the litigant opposing the class should be taxed.
This is analogous to the rule proposed for joinder. See text accompanying notes 35-36
,mtpra.
1,See note 82 infra.
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that time that a class action is not the proper device or that subclasses
are appropriate.
Perhaps the authors of the new rule did not go further because
they had already incorporated a revolutionary innovation when they
purported to bind absentees who did not seek exclusion. Admittedly,
under the new rule any absentee who does not want to be included in
the class action can ask to be excluded. Nevertheless, the new rule
does grant the district courts jurisdiction over the absentee: he is
2
bound by the judgment unless he seeks to be excluded.1
The question arises from where the courts derive this power to
bind absentees outside their jurisdiction. Regulation of the jurisdiction
of the federal courts is vested by the Constitution in Congress; I Congress, therefore, can expand the jurisdiction of the district courts by an
appropriate statute, so long as the increase in the courts' jurisdiction
does not offend the due process clause or any other provision of the
Constitution." In the case of the above amendment to rule 23, however, the Supreme Court has increased the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over absentees in class actions by amending a rule of civil
62 Neither old nor new rule 23 expressly deals with the question of diversity
jurisdiction. Decisions interpreting old rule 23 held that in spurious class actions
there must be complete diversity between the class representatives and the party
opposing the class. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Dillon, 92 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) ;
Zelley v. Muehleck, 10 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1950). Each class representative was
also required to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. See, e.g., Hackner v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941); Goldberg v. Whittier Corp., 111 F. Supp.
382 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Schuman v. Little Bay Constr. Co., 110 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953); Gullo v. Veterans' Co-op. Housing Ass'n, 13 F.R.D. 11 (D.D.C. 1952);
Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1949); 3 MooRE
123.10(3) [1], at 3443. This rule developed because the claim of each class member
in a spurious class action was considered to be separate, see note 52 supra, and
therefore there had to be complete diversity between each class representative and
the party opposing the class. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1805).
The new rule has abolished the distinctions between the classes, but has not
resolved the independent grounds of jurisdiction problem. Undoubtedly, this again
was left for the courts to decide. It is suggested that the requirement for complete
diversity with regard to the class representatives should be preserved. However, since
all class members will now be bound if they do not request exclusion, it seems that
the financial requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction is satisfied if the claims
of all the class members not requesting exclusion total at least $10,000, for this class
under the new rules approximates the "true" class under the old rules. See Simeone,
Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 Mic. L. REv. 905 (1962) ; Blume, .urisdictiond Amount in Representative Suits, 15 MINN. L. Rxv. 501, 502 (1931):
The general test for permitting the use of representative suits and for allowing
aggregation of interests for purposes of jurisdiction being apparently identical,
the conclusion would seem to follow that whenever a representative suit is
properly employed the value of the interests of the plaintiffs as a group should
be deemed the amount in dispute rather than the value of the separate
interests of the individual plaintiffs.
See 3A Moorn 19.01-117].
63"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; 2 MooRE 4.02[3], at 951
64
Caulfield v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 293 F.2d 217, 219 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 858 (1962); Peterson v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12, 13 (N.D.
Iowa 1964) ; Flohr v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 745, 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Trauss
v. City of Philadelphia, 159 F. Supp. 672, 674-75 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Moses Taylor
Lodge 95 v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 39 F. Supp. 456, 457 (M.D. Pa. 1941); Seligman's, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 895, 900 (W.D. La. 1939).
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procedure,6 5 and it is not clear that Congress has given the Court the
power to do this.
Section 2072 of the Judicial Code, which lodges the rule-making
power in the Supreme Court, states that the rules of civil procedure
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 66 In
seeming accord with this proviso, rule 82 states that "these rules shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts or the venue of actions therein." It therefore
seems clear that only Congressional enactments, and not the federal
rules, may extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is true,
of course, that the Supreme Court has increased the jurisdiction of the
district courts by amending rule 4.67 No court has questioned the
legality of these amendments; it is difficult to imagine one doing so.
Likewise, it is probable that no court will question the amendment to
rule 23. Nevertheless, the fact still remains that the amendment to
rule 23 rests on questionable statutory foundations. s
In the past, Congress usually has increased the jurisdiction of the
courts by passing a specific statute. 9 To remove all doubt on the
question, Congress should pass a Federal Class Actions Act specifically
granting the district courts nationwide service of process in such suits.
The jurisdiction question is especially acute under the proposal
made by this Comment, since all absentees who do not show good
cause for exclusion will be bound by the judgment in the class action.
However, the conception of an involuntary plaintiff is certainly not
novel,70 and, since the plaintiff-absentee will be forced to litigate in the
65

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions ...
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect ....

28 U.S.C. §2072 (1964).
66
Id.
0

7See the amendments to rule 4 which became effective July 1, 1963. Rule 4(e)
allows a federal court to obtain jurisdiction over a person residing outside the state,
if a long-arm statute of the state in which the district court is located would give
a state court jurisdiction over that person. Rule 4(f) adopts a rule allowing for,
service of process over persons residing within 100 miles of the location of the trial,
regardless of the state in which they reside.
68Under the old true class action, it was assumed that all members of the class
were bound by the result of the class action. It must also be assumed that a court
handing down a decision in a true class action had jurisdiction over those members

of the class residing outside the court's jurisdiction. The extent of the court's jurisdiction in a true class action has never been challenged, primarily because most,
members of a true class will reside within the same state. Therefore, it never has
been affirmatively stated from where the courts derived their jurisdictional powers
to bind all members of a true class regardless of their residency.
69 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964), granting the district courts nationwide service
of process for all interpleader actions falling under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) contains provisions for making an unwilling absentee
an involuntary plaintiff: "If . . . [an indispensable party] has not been so joined,
the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff." See also Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).

FEDERAL MULTIPARTY PRACTICE

class action only to the extent that he has an interest in common with
other members of the class, it seems entirely appropriate to give the
class action forum jurisdiction over him, so long as steps are taken to
lessen the inconvenience to him. Such steps have already been suggested-the trial judge should have the power to implement subclasses 7'
and to tax costs. 72
In the examination of multistate compulsory joinder cases, it was
necessary to propose new venue rules in order to protect the absentee.73
The same need exists with multistate class actions, and the same rules
should be applied. Venue in a multistate class action is properly laid
only in a state having sufficient contacts with the act or omission which
led to the class action, or in a state in which a major portion of the
property which is the subject of the class action is located.
The district court will continue to apply the conflict-of-laws rules
of the state in which it is sitting, as required by Klaxon.7' The proposed venue statute, however, requires that the action be brought in a
state having sufficient contacts with the controversy. Therefore, only
the conflict-of-laws rules of a state having sufficient contacts with the
75
case will be employed in selecting the proper substantive law.

Granting the district courts jurisdiction over the absentee does
not resolve the question of when they should exercise that jurisdiction.
As indicated in a previous section, 7 6 there are important interests of
both the litigants and the court which are best served by binding the
absentee. Therefore, it would seem proper to include the absentee in
the litigation if the interests of the other parties are thereby enhanced
to a greater degree than the interests of the absentee are jeopardized.
Even after it is decided that the absentee should be included in the
litigation, he still should not be bound by the result of the litigation,
unless his rights are protected during the litigation to the extent that
they would be if he were actually litigating himself. Before any party
can be bound by the result of a suit, the due process requirements of
adequate notice must be met. The new rule requires that "the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort," be com71 If one-third of the class members reside on the east coast and two-thirds
on the west coast, the trial judge should be disposed to split the class, unless the
defendant is willing to make concessions (such as assuming some travel costs) to
ease the burden on the distant absentees or unless the trial judge himself can devise
a more feasible alternative. For instance, the nearby absentees might be able adequately to represent the cross-country absentees so that extensive travel costs are
not necessary.
72 If a class member whose share of the total claim is small initiates the suit, he
certainly should not be able thereby to bind distant absentees with large shares unless
he is73willing to assume the costs entailed by his choice of a forum.
See text accompanying note 32 .rupra.
74
See text accompanying note 33 supra.
75

See note 34 .rpra and accompanying text.
76 See text accompanying notes 2-3 srupra.
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municated to all absentees. 7' Since the absentee's interests are being
adjudicated as if he were present, "the best notice practicable" would
seem to require personal notice in most cases. In some cases, however,
the number of absentees might be very large and their individual claims
small. In such a case, the court might decide that some type of limited
personal notice 78 or publication 71 is appropriate. If the court does
decide that publication is the only practical solution, the publication
should be made with sufficient notoriety to apprise the absentee of the
class action. In cases where the names and addresses of all the members of a fairly large class are not known by the class representatives,
the court should adopt the rule of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.' as a starting point.
After receiving notice of the class action, the absentee might move
to be excluded from the suit. The trial judge should dismiss any
absentee who can show good cause why he should not be included in
the judgment.' The absentee should also be excused if he can demonstrate to the court that the suit could better be handled in subclasses.' 2
If the absentee does not succeed in either of these arguments, the trial
judge should include him in his determination of the composition of
the class. 8
7
7

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).

For example, a nonregistered mimeographed letter might be sent to all members
of the class.
79 This type of notice should only be resorted to in those cases where the class
is large, the individual claims of the various members are small and the addresses
of the members are not known.
Notice must be sent to all members of the class whose
80 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
names and addresses can be discovered with due diligence. For those members of
the class whose names and addresses cannot be discovered, publication is sufficient.
rd. at 317-18.
81
See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
82
Fa. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4) (B) states: "a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly." To implement the suggestions proposed in this
Comment, this section should be interpreted to mean that the trial judge will have
the authority, as a condition to excusing the absentee who proves that the class
action could best be handled in subclasses, to require that the absentee actually bring
a class action in another jurisdiction before he is excused altogether. If this section
will not bear this interpretation, then this situation should fall under the purview
of the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964) :
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.
These subsidiary class actions can only be brought in districts which could have
exerted jurisdiction over the defendant the class is suing. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363
U.S. 335 (1960).
83 The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether
or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3). See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259
F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
78
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After the absentee has been included in the class, the court must
continue to protect his rights. First, the court must insure that the
class representatives adequately protect the interests of all absentees
who will be bound by the result. Adequate representation is a difficult
problem which cannot be resolved according to a percentage formula."
Moreover, the courts are not always able to ascertain whether the class
representatives standing before them adequately represent the absentees, since they are often unaware of the interests of the individual
absentees. The first few cases decided under the new rule have taken
an initial step toward solving this problem, placing the burden upon
the litigant representing the class to prove to the satisfaction of the
trial judge that he will adequately represent the absentees."
An additional safeguard to insure that the absentee is adequately
protected is the provision in the new rule permitting all absentees to
make an appearance through their own counsel."' It is questionable
whether the inclusion of this right is necessary or wise. Allowing all
absentees to intervene as a matter of right could hopelessly clutter the
class action with too many parties. A preferred middle course would
require an absentee seeking to intervene to prove that the litigant does
not, in fact, adequately represent his interests, or, if the litigant does
adequately represent the absentee, that the absentee's intervention will
not disrupt the trial. There is little reason why different standards of
intervention should exist under rules 23 and 24(a) .87 It therefore is
suggested that this provision be deleted from rule 23, thus allowing
rule 24(a) to govern intervention by absentee class members. Nevertheless, the court still has an obligation to protect the interests of those
absentees who cannot present sufficient reasons to justify intervention.
The court must insure that such an absentee remains adequately represented and that his interests are thoroughly litigated. 8 The new rule
contains provisions requiring notice to absentees during the trial of
84

For cases indicating the problem of determining whether the absentees are

adequately represented, see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) ; Ford Motor Co.
v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957); Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171
F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941);
Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940); S. C. Johnson &
Son v. Boe, 187 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See also 3 Moon 23.07[4], at
3430-33.
85
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966). The courts
are concerned about large and unwieldy classes. See School District v. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).

86Fm. R. Civ. P. 2 3(c) (2) (C). This provision probably was added with an
eye toward
the due process requirements.
87
See notes 42-43 mspra and accompanying text.
88 As a general rule, individuals are required to look out for their own interests,
and there is no affirmative duty on the part of the courts to protect those interests
during the trial. If, however, in the interest of preventing the litigation from becoming
cluttered, intervention is not granted as of right, there should be a corresponding
duty on the courts to make sure that all those who will be bound by the judgment
are protected.
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significant developments of which they should be apprised, as well as
other procedural powers designed to protect all parties involved."9 If
at any time the absentee demonstrates to the court that he no longer is
being adequately represented, he should be permitted to intervene.
If the absentee is forced to intervene to protect his interests, his
expenses in excess of what it would cost him to litigate the same issue
in his own state might be taxed to the class representative. The
realization that he might have to assume some of the absentee's expenses should encourage the litigant to protect the absentee's interests
during the litigation.
CONCLUSION

Multiparty procedures are complex both because of the number
of parties involved and because of the endless variety of different relationships presented. As a consequence of this complexity, rigid rules
governing the use of multiparty devices break down when called upon
to deal with varying situations. Rigidity was the major flaw in the
old rules and consequently one of the prime reasons behind the revisions of those rules.
In rewriting Federal Rules 19, 23 and 24, the Advisory Committee has gone far toward adopting a model system of multiparty
procedures which adequately protects the interests of both the litigant
and the absentee and at the same time is easily administrable by the
courts. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee has not gone far
enough, perhaps because they felt reform in several steps would be
more readily accepted than an immediate overhaul of the rules.
In the area of joinder, the committee did away with the inflexible
"joint interest" test for determining when an absentee is indispensable,
but this change does not solve the problem completely, for if an
absentee is declared indispensable the action must be dismissed. A
far better approach would enable the litigant to join all essential
absentees with the proviso that he assume their additional costs.
Of the three areas of reform, the changes in intervention came
closest to the proposals of this Comment. Under the new rule,
an absentee's interests are protected in a practical as well as a legal
89 In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make

appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members
of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation
fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise
to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties
or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).

FEDERAL MULTIPARTY PRACTICE

sense. The major advantage in the new rule and in old rule 24(b)
is the flexibility to deal with varied fact situations.
In revising the rules for class actions, the Advisory Committee
adopted the right course in seeking to bind all absentees to the result
of the class suit. Nevertheless, further changes still must be made.
First, an absentee only should be allowed to obtain exclusion from
the suit upon a showing of good cause. Second, before bringing the
suit the class representatives must indicate to the satisfaction of the
court that they will adequately represent the interests of the absentees.
With the addition of this safeguard, absentees no longer need the
additional protection of intervention at will. Third, if the absentee
must intervene to protect his rights, the courts should consider taxing
his traveling costs to the class representatives.
The suggestions made above are premised on the assumption that,
if at all possible, a controversy should be resolved in one suit. In the
past, rules of jurisdiction, venue and procedure designed to protect
the rights of the absentee have hindered this goal. Although the purposes behind such rules are legitimate, nevertheless, it is possible to
protect the interests of the absentee without drastic consequences
for the litigant's cause of action. Until these suggestions are adopted,
the scales of justice will continue to come down in favor of the
absentee at the expense of both the litigants and the courts.

